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Erca: Reproductive Rights

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS V.
MYERS: PROCREATIVE CHOICE
GUARANTEED FOR ALL WOMEN

The problem of birth control has arisen
directly from the effort of the feminine
spirit to free itself from bondage. 1

In 1973, the United States Supreme Court established abortion as a constitutional right for all women.- One might have
expected that the following five years would have brought the
end of the abortion controversy; instead, the first wave of vehement counterattacks led by anti-choice forces s had only begun.
1. M. SANGER, WOMEN AND THE NEW RAes (1920).
2. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973), the United States Supreme Court asserted that the right of privacy
encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The Court
also recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring both the health of the
mother and in protecting potential life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162. In resolving the
conflict between the woman's unimpaired freedom of choice and the state's interest, the
Court held that before the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, neither the state interest in ensuring the mother's health nor in protecting potential life is substantial enough
to justify an intrusion into the woman's freedom. Id. In the second trimester, the state
interest in the health of the mother is sufficiently substantial to justify regulation. However, in the third trimester, when viability of the fetus is achieved, the state interest in
protecting potential life justifies prohibition against abortion, except when necessary to
protect the life of the mother. Id. at 163.
3. The anti-choice or anti-abortion forces are usually called by their chosen names
which are "Pro-Life" and "Right to Life." However, the terms anti-choice or anti-abortion groups will be used in this Note to refer to groups advocating the elimination of
legal access to abortion. Important among these groups is the National Right to Life
Committee, an umbrella organization of anti-abortion groups. The National Right to Life
Committee boasts a membership of over 11,000,000, and has affiliates in all 50 states.
State organizations have been able to gather considerable financial resources, raised
through tax-deductible contributions to their "education funds." RELIGIous CoALmON
FOR ABORTION RIGHTS, THE ABORTION RIGHTS CRISIS (1978). The California Pro-Life
Council, Inc. is the umbrella organization for the scattered California anti-abortion
groups.
Senators Joseph Montoya and David Roberti and Representative Alister McAlister,
three of the legislators who have been most responsible for introducing bills infringing
upon women's access to abortion, are on the Advisory Board of the California Pro-Life
Council, Inc., the California affiliate to the National Right to Life COmmittee.
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Their banner was abortion, and their first major target was the
most vulnerable-young and poor women.·
Shortly after a five-justice majority of the United States Supreme Court reached its decision upholding the Hyde Amendment,II which restricted federal funding for abortion, the California Legislature voted to severely restrict Medi-Cal funds for
abortion in its 1978 Budget Act.' Implementation of the CaliforThere are some distinct differences between the two major organizations supporting
and opposing abortion-the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and the
National Right to Life Committee (NRLC). For example, NRLC members are more
likely to bave been raiaec:l in large families, to prefer large families and to have 18l'Je
families. NRLC members are also more likely than NARAL members to oppose sex education in IIChools, the availability of birth control information to teenagers, divorce, and
contraceptive sterilization. They are also more likely to believe that premarital, extra
marital and homoaesual relations are wrong. Most NRLC members oppose the ERA;
most NARAL members support it. NARAL has a higher percentage of female members
and directors than NRLC. NARAL members are somewhat better educated, have higher
incomea and more often live in large cities and their suburbs than NRLC members. Almost 70% of NRLC members are Catholic, while only 4% of NARAL members are
Catholic. Almoet none of the NRLC members are Jewish; 17% of NARAL are Jewish.
Participation by Protestants and Blacks is low in both NRLC and NARAL. Whatever
their religion, nine out of ten NRLC members reported that religion plays a very important part in their lives compared to one out of five NARAL members. Granberg, The
Abortion Activittl, 4 FAM. PLAN. PBRsP. 157 (1981).
4. Young and poor women have few resources to fight back against abortion restrictions and the moet to gain by the unfettered continuance of abortion services. In California, in 1976, 35% of alll8lill abortions were performed on women under the age of 20. In
that same year, 50% of allleaal abortions were paid by Medi·Cal. PLANNBD PAJWI'I1IOOD
Ano.IATU or CALJrORNIA, THa FACTS or LIn 1M CALIPORNIA 1981, compiled from STAft
Da>AItTIimtn' or IhALTH SUVJCU ABORTION IbPoRTS (March, 1981).
6. The Hyde Ameneiment altered the 1977 Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (currently the Department of Health and Human Services) appropriations biD,
and provided reimbursement for abortions "only where the life of the mother would be
endangered if the fetus were carried to term." Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439 I
209, 90 Stat. 1434. A second "Hyde Amendment" was passed in the summer of 1977
allowing for funding where the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest in addition to the
earlier exception for cases in which the woman's life was endangered. Act of Dec. 9, 1977.
Pub. L. No. 95·205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460.
In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.s. 297 (1980), a majority of the United States Supreme
CouIt upheld restrictions on federal Medicaid funding on abortions (similar to the propoeed California Medi·Cal restrictions). Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the prosram provided unequal treatment in the distribution of public benefits, it concluded that the Federal Constitution required no special justification for the distribution
as long as the prOlJ'am placed no new obtacles in the path of the woman seeking to
exercise her constitutional right. rd. at 315.
6. The Budget Act of 1978, 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 359, § 2 (expired June 30, 1979),
provided that abortions would be funded by the atate:
(a> Where the life of the mother would be endangered if the
fetus were carried to full term.
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nia restrictions, however, was stayed until the California Supreme Court found the Budget Act restriction unconstitutional
in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers
(C.D.R.R.J.7

Although the United States and California Supreme Courts
interpreted similar statutory restrictions, the courts analyzed
them under different constitutional theories. The United States
(b) Where the pregnancy is ectopic.
(c) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under
Section 261.5 of the Penal Code, and such act has been reported, within 60 days, to a law enforcement agency or a public health agency which has immediately reported it to a law
enforcement agency, and the abortion occurs during the first
trimester.
(d) Where. the pregnancy results from an act punishable under
Section 261.5 of the Penal Code, and the female is under 16
years of age, and the abortion is performed no later than the
first trimester, provided the female's parent or guardian or, if
none, an adult of the female's choice is notified at least five
days prior to the abortion by the physician who performs the
abortion. Regulations governing the notice requirement shall
be promulgated by the Director of the Department of Health
Services.
(e) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under
Section 285 of the Penal Code and such act has been reported
to a law enforcement agency or a public health agency which
has immediately reported it to a law enforcement agency and
the abortion occurs no later than during the second trimester.
(0 Where it is determined by fluid obtained through amniocentosis that the mother is likely to give birth to a child with
a major or severe genetic or congenital abnormality due to the
presence of chromosomal abnormalities, neural tube defects,
biochemical diseases, hemoglobinopathies, sex:linked diseases,
and the infectious processes.
(g) Where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to
the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term,
on account of any of the following conditions: Toxemia: renal
failure: diabetes with vascular degeneration: thrombosis, Addison's disease: high blood pressure with renal complications;
high blood pressure with previous cardio-vascular accident:
hydatdiform mole: congestive cardiac failure: and placentia
previa, when so certified under penalty of perjury by two physicians, one of whom, where practicable, is a specialist in the
affected medical discipline, and documentation thereof is provided with the claim for payment.
7. 29 Cal. 3d 252,625 P.2d 779,172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). The California Legislature
re-enacted the provisions of the 1981 Budget Act restricting Medi-Cal coverage for abortion despite the California Supreme Court finding that the restrictions were unconstitutional. C.D.R.R. subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandate and a temporary stay
to prevent implementation of the statute.
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Supreme Court found that no constitutional right was violated
because the fundamental right to privacy only protected the woman against undue burdens on her right to decide between abortion and childbirth.' The Court found that the woman's right to
choose was not unduly burdened because the government had
not directly interfered with any fundamental right. The Court
concluded that the Federal Constitution required no special justification for the government to withhold funds for abortion, but
not childbirth, because the program placed no new obstacles in
the path of the wo~an seeking to exercise her right of choice.'
In keeping with three decades of California precedent,IO the
California Supreme Court held that special scrutiny will be applied whether or not the state erects new obstacles that impede
the exercise of a constitutional right;l1 the impediment may fall
short of an absolute prohibition to the right. Unlike the United
States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court has acknowledged "both the practical importance of many governmen--tal benefits to individual recepients and the corresponding likelihood that a discriminatory benefit program will effectively
nullify important constitutional rights. "11
This Note will trace the development of the right to privacy
as applied to abortion funding and as interpreted by the United
States and California Supreme Courts. Although both courts
have recognized the physical and psychological harm from
forced childbearing or parenting, only the California court has
been willing to unequivocally acknowledge the enormous implications on a woman's education, employment and associational
opportunities. II For a woman, the right to privacy, inherent in
8. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980).
9. Id. at 315.
10. See C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 263, 625 P.2d at 786,172 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
11. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
12. Id. at 268, 625 P.2d at 788, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
13. Id. at 275, 625 P.2d at 791,172 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (citing Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YAU L.J. 624,641 n.90 (1980». For example, teenage parents

have substantially less education, hold lower-prestige jobs and have greater job dissatisfaction than their classmates who postpone childbearing. There are fewer opportunities
for education and employment for teenage mothers than for teenage fathers who do not
experience the emotional and physical problems of childbirth and usually assume less
responsibility for the care of the child. Card &: Wise, Teenage Mothers and Teenage
Fathers: The Impact of Early Child Bearing on the Parents' Personal and Professional
Lives. 4 FAY. PLAN. PusP. 199 (1978).
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the decision whether or not to bear a child, is essential for personal control of her body. Unlike the United States Supreme
Court, the C.D.R.R. court has asserted that all women have the
right to procreative choice.
I. PROCREATIVE CHOICE: A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
GUARANTEED BY BOTH FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONS

The emphasis must not be on the right to abortion but on the right to privacy and reproductive
control. 14

A.

THE FEDERAL GUARANTEE

The birth of the federal right of privacy was first announced
in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut. 111 The origins of the right
and the areas included within the "zones of privacy"18 were ambiguous; the members of the Court were unable h agree on the
14. Cary, Life Faces Portia- How Feminists Are Changing the Law, Ms., Apr.
1974, at 94 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsberg). Without the full capacity to limit her own
reproduction, a woman's other "freedoms" are tantalizing mockeries that cannot long be
denied, since the chief rationale for denial disappears. Cisler, Unfinished Business: Birth
. Control and Women's Liberation, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 245-46 (R. Morgan ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as Unfinished Business).
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The defendants, operators of a birth control clinic, were
prosecuted for dispensing birth control devices to a married couple in violation of a Connecticut criminal statute which prohibited the use of contraceptives.
16. Activities that take place in the home or a1fect marriage and childbirth have
received the greatest protection. Less traditional lifestyles have been afforded less protection. Griswold recognized a constitutionally protected zone of privacy surrounding existing constitutional guarantees, but the Court failed to identify the parameters of the
right. Nevertheless, the protected zone clearly includes a married couple's right to use
contraceptives. The zone of privacy also protects certain activities performed within the
home, such as the right to possess "obscene" materials. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969).
Courts have responded divergently to sexual privacy cases. Compare Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (no constitutional rights where
sodomy laws were enforced against two consenting adult males in private) with Ancofora
v. Board of Education, 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Md. 1973) ("[T)he time has come today
for private, consenting adult homosexuality to enter the sphere of constitutionally protected interests") and Mindel v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485
(N.D. Cal. 1970). The Mindel court held that a man was illegally fired from the Post
Office because he lived with a woman who was not his wife. The court found that because private sexual behavior is constitutionally protected, the state could not invade the
sanctity of the man's home without compelling justification. The court did not specify
whether the protection was due to the nature of the sexual behavior, the fact that the
activity had taken place in the home, or because the government could not have discovered this information without intrusive investigation.
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precise constitutional basis for the right. Although seven of the
justices believed the Constitution protected the right to privacy
in some manner, no more than three agreed on any theory supporting that right.
Justice Douglas found certain unenumerated rights within
the "penumbra" of existing constitutional guarantees. 17 He contended that "without these peripheral rights the specific rights
would be less secure."IS "The present case," he concluded, "concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees."le The right established by the Court was not to protect the individuals who
might choose to use contraceptives; it was to protect the intimate relationship between the married couple and their
physician. so
The right to privacy in the use of contraceptives was extended to individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird:II
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy
in question inhered in the marital relationship.
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.l •

Thus, the right to practice contraception without undue
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-85. Specifically, Justice Douglae constructed the right out of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth admendmente.
18. Id. at 484-83.
19. Id. at 485 (emphaeis added).
20. Id. at 482.
21. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). At the close of a lecture on overpopulation and contraception, Baird invited members of the audience to help themselves to contraceptive articles.
He personally handed a package of contraceptive fOBnl to a young, allegedly single, woman. Id. at 440 n.l. As a result of dispensing the fOBnl, Baird wae convicted of violating a
statute (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21-21A (West 1966» which made it a crime to
sell, lend or give away any contraceptive drug, medicine, instrument, or article, except if
the actor wae a physician administering or prescribing contraceptives to married persons
or a pharmacist filling out prescriptions to married persons. Id. at 438.
22. Id. at 453 (emphaeis in original).
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governmental interference rests with the individual, not the
marital relationship. The Court's recognition of the separate intellectual and emotional entities of the couple was an important
step for the liberation of women from unwanted childbirth. It is
the woman who usually takes responsibility for the success or
failure of contraception since she is the individual who is most
directly affected by and concerned with pregnancy, its termination by either abortion or childbirth, and childcare. It follows
then, that it is the woman who feels the greatest social, economic
and health impacts as a result of governmental policies which
restrict her ability to obtain obstetric care.
The right of privacy to procure birth control evolved even
further as a result of Roe v. Wade l l and Doe v. Bolton." In his
opinions for the Court,lIII Justice Blackmun proclaimed the decision to terminate a pregnancy is encompassed within the constitutionally protected right of privacy.le The Court ruled, however, that the right to choose abortion is not absolute. The Court
divided the full term of pregnancy into trimesters to facilitate its
analysis concerning the competing interests between women and
the state. With respect to the first trimester, because of the minimized health risks of abortion,17 the Court held the state has no
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
25. The United States Supreme Court first addressed the abortion controveny in
1973 when it decided Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. Roe involved Teus statutes which
made it illegal to perform an abortion unless it was necesaary to save the mother's life.
Doe challenged Georgia statutes which limited the availability of abortions by requiring
that: (1) The attending physician obtain the concurrence of two other physicians that
the procedure was necessary; (2) a hospital committee make such a finding; (3) the abortion be performed in an accredited hospital; and (4) the patient be a Georgia resident.
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
27. Justice Blackmun relied heavily on the argument that abortion laws became UDconstitutional when abortion became sarer than childbirth. ld. at 150 (citing Means, The
Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus. 1664-1968; A COle
of Cessation of Constitutionality (pt. 1). 14 N.Y.L. FORUM 411, 418-28 (1968). Tracing
the history of New York State anti-abortion laws, Means asserts that the origin of that
1828 law, and of similar statutes in other states, lay in a wish to protect women from the
dangers of nineteenth century surgery, not in a wish to limit their control of their bodies.
Means, supra at 411-515. One may question whether maternal protection was the entire
reason for revoking women's common-law right to abortion. Perhaps the physician activists who led the crusade against abortion in the nineteenth century had personal, professional, or political motives. Although many physicians of that day probably regarded
abortion as morally wrong, they were also intent on professionalizing the practice of
medicine and restoring themselves to a respected position as leaders of society. F. JIt.PFEE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS 65 (1981) [hereinafter cited as F. JAFR,
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interest in regulating the decision whether or not to bear a
child. IS During the second trimester the state's interest in protecting maternal health does arise. At this time the state is justified in imposing conditions upon abortion services to the extent
that such conditions reasonably relate to the protection of the
mother's health.1II During the third trimester, when the fetus is
viable, the state's interest in protecting potential life is sufficient
to justify the prohibition of abortion. 80
et all. The abortion issue gave licensed physicians a means to highlight the dangers in a
procedure that was performed largely by "irregular doctors." [d. Legal abortion could
have been viewed as giving health professionals an important means of optimizing their
patients well-being; instead, it was viewed as threatening their roles. [d. at 66. At an
American Medical Association (AMA) meeting in 1970, one physician noted: "'Legal
abortion makes the patient truly the physician: She makes the diagnosis and establishes
the therapy.''' [d. This obviously does not fit the physician's self-image as healer and
teacher. The physician who declared, "'a woman is a uterus surrounded by a supporting
organism and directing personality,''' would hardly want to be deemed merely a technician who carries out his patient's wishes. F. JAFFEE, et aI., supra at 64 (quoting I. Galdston, M.D., cited in M. S. CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 118 (1958».
Physicians are still reluctant to provide abortion services. Seven years after the Roe
and Doe decisions, many women are still unable to obtain abortions either because there
are no providers in the counties in which they live or the services that do exist are minimal. Seima, Abortion Availability in the United States. 2 FA... PLAN. PERSP. 88. 93
(1980). In eight out of ten U.S. counties. services were not adequate to meet the abortion
need. As a result. more than one million women were unable to obtain abortions in their
own counties; five out of ten could not obtain them at all. [d. at 88. For some women.
traveling to other counties caused them little difficulty. For others. especially poor,
young and rural women, travel was difficult, if not imp088ible. [d. at 93.
lt is very hard to believe that abortion was safer than childbirth in the early 1700's,
or any other "legal" operation for that matter, yet. no law seemed necessary then. What
happens if, once again, childbirth is made le88 threatening, from a physical standpoint,
than abortion? Do anti-abortion laws suddenly become constitutional again? Or have
women won the inalienable right to take calculated risks in their interest for self-determination? All the excellent health supporting reasons-improved health,lower birth and
death rate, freer medical practice, happier families, sexual privacy-"are only embroidery on the basic fabric: women's right to her own reproduction." Unfinished Businell,
,upra note 14. at 276. That one reason belies the notion that women are only nurtuant
creatures who welcome every new p088ibility of adding a new member to the human race.
That a woman may not want another child, or even one child. requires admitting that
the traditional espectation is a gr088 oversimplification of the nature of women. This was
something the Supreme Court was not yet prepared to do. Erickson. Women and the
Supreme Court: Anatomy ia Destiny, 41 BROOKLYN L.R. 209. 255 (1974) (citing ROBBi,
Abortion Law. and Their Victims, TJu.NSACTlON, Sept./Oct. 1966, at 7).
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.s. at 163.
29.ld.
30. Id. at 163-64. The Court defined viable as the point at which the fetus is potentially able to live outside the mother's womb. even with the help of artificial aid. [d. at

160.
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Roe and Doe have been criticized for leaving unanswered as
many questions as they resolved. 81 One question important to
women's rights is to whom did the Court entrust the right to
decide whether or not to terminate pregnancy? At the beginning
of his opinion in Roe, Justice Blackmun wrote the "right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."11 In a surprising
shift of focus, Justice Blackmun turned to an entirely different
relationship: the "physician and his pregnant patient. "II "For
the period of pregnancy prior to this 'compelling point,' the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine without regulation by the state that the patient's pregnancy should be terminated."8. Finally, the transfer from the
pregnant woman's right to decide to the physician's right to decide for her was complete: "Up to [the third trimester,] the
abortion decision in all aspects is inherently, and primarily, a
medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with
the physician."8&
Following the rationale of Roe and Doe, does a woman,
then, only have a right to terminate her pregnancy but not the
right to decide to terminate it? If her right is to privacy, how
can it be conditioned upon the concurrence of a physician?
Clearly, to grant women the right to decide is to give women
more power to shape their destinies; the very power which for so
many years has been denied them.

B.

THE CALIFORNIA GUARANTEE

The California Supreme Court first recognized the funda31. For example, Roe did 1'I0t decide whether a minor was entitled to abortion with
parental consent or notification, or whether the father or husband had veto power. It also
left vague the definition of viability. All these have set the stage for future legislation
fountain-headed by anti-abortion groups.
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
33. Id. at 156.
34. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion expanded upon the same reasoning: "The right of privacy has no more conspicuous place
than in the physician-patient relationship, unless it be in the priest-penitent relation."
Id. at 219. He then concluded that the Georgia statute at issue in Doe-requiring a woman to obtain approval of two physicians in addition to her own for an abortion-was a
"total destruction of the right of privacy between physician and patient and the intimacy
of relation which that entails." Id.
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mental right of procreative choice in People u. Belous. 86 Belous
was decided four years before the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the existence of a comparable federal constitutional right. I? The court found the statutory language, "necessary to preserve the life of the mother,"aB unconstitutionally
vague: a• "If the fact of ill health or the mere 'possibility' of suicide·o is sufficient to meet the test of 'necessary to preserve her
life,'41 it is clear that a showing of immediacy or certainty of
death is not essential for a lawful abortion."41 The court held
that such a definition would' be an invalid infringement on the
woman's constitutional k'right to life48 and to choose whether to
bear children."·· The court further asserted that the critical is36. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 915
(1970). Belous, a physician and surgeon, appealed his conviction for performing an abortion and conspiracy' to commit an abortion in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 274
(amended repeatedly since 1967) and CAL. PENAL COOl! § 184 (West 1970).
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See supra
notes 15-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal guarantee of procreative choice.
38. Section 274 of the Penal Code then read:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to
any woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine,
drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison . . . .
CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (amended repeatedly since 1967).
Section 274 now provides:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to
any woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine,
drug or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, except as provided in the Therapeutic
Abortion Act. . . is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison.
CAL. PENAL CoOl! § 274 (West Supp. 1981).
39. People v. BeloUB, 71 Cal. 2d at 962-63, 458 P.2d at 198-99, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 35960.
40. People v. Abaranel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1965). The obstetrician performed an abortion after receiving letters from two psychiatrists indicating an
abortion was necessary to prevent a possible suicide. The court reversed the conviction
because the state could not prove the necessary criminal intent that the abortion was
performed for a purpose other than to save the woman's life.
41. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 962, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.

42.Id.
43. Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359. "The woman's right to life is
involved because childbirth involves risks of death." Id.
44. Id. The Court based its finding of the right to chOOlle whether or not to bear
children on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). "The fundamental right of
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sue was not whether the rights existed, but whether the state
had a compelling interest in their regulation. 4I The court concluded the compelling state interests were protection of maternal health and protection of the fetus.· 8
The court found that infringement of fundamental rights,
resulting from a requirement that death of the mother be certain, was not justified on the basis of considerations of the woman's health when abortion is during the first trimester of pregnancy.·? The pregnant woman's right to lifen took precedence
over the state's interest in protecting potential life.·' Additionally, the vagueness of the statute caused the physician to act at
"his" peril when "he" determined that the woman was entitled
to an abortion. 60 Thus, the physician had a personal stake in
reaching the conclusion that the woman should not have an
abortion. 61 The statute would have deprived those women of
abortions who were entitled to them for medical reasons. 6 '
The California Supreme Court declined to decide the constitutionality of the Therapeutic Abortion Act6 ' because the act
a woman to choose whether or not to bear children follows from the Supreme Court's
and this court's repeated acknowledgment of a 'right to privacy' or 'liberty' in mattera
related to marriage, family, and sex." People v. Beloue, 71 Cal. 2d at 963, 458 P.2d at
199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
45. ld. at 964, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
46. ld. at 965·67, 458 P.2d at 201·02, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 361·62.
47. ld.
48. The Court defined "right to life" as the right of a woman to be free from the
risks of childbirth. ld. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
49. ld. at 969,458 P.2d at 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
50. ld. at 972, 458 P.2d at 204, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
51. ld.
52. ld. at 973, 458 P.2d at 205, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 365. Again, it appears that a high
court is constructing the right of procreative choice upon the foundation of health.
53. The Therapeutic Abortion Act provides:
A holder of the physician's and surgeon's certificate, as de·
fined in the Business and Professions Code, is authorized to
perform an abortion or aid or assist or attempt an abortion,
only if each of the following requirements is met:
(a) The abortion takes place in a hospital which is accredited
by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
(b) The abortion is approved in advance by a committee of the
medical staff of the hospital, which committee is established
and maintained in accordance with standards promulgated by
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. In any
case in which the committee of the medical staff consists of no
more than three licensed physicians and surgeons, the unani·
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was adopted after the abortion performed by Dr. Belous. The
act denies abortion unless the committee of the medical staff
finds that "[t]here is a substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of
the mother," and/or "[t]he pregnancy resulted from rape or incest."&4 The proponents of change appear to picture women as
victims----of rape, incest, or disease-never as shapers of their
own destinies. 1I11 Still, a woman's right to privacy to choose
whether or not to bear children is contingent upon her victimization: She must be a victim of mental or physical disorder or
rape to qualify for that which is hers as a person. This paternalistic attitude is almost always the basis for any reform of repressive laws governing women. The C.D.R.R. court departed from
this protectiveness rationale by insisting that "the constitutional
right of choice is essential [for a woman's] ability to retain personal control over her own body."
II. THE DIVERGENCE OF UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURTS ON THE ISSUE OF
ABORTION FUNDING

A.

FEDERAL DEFUNDING OF ABORTION

In the wake of Roe and Doe, many states implemented
abortion statutes in accordance with the standards set forth by
the Supreme Court. However, because the Court left many questions unanswered, state legislatures, influenced by a very vocal
minority,1I7 seized upon any means of limiting a woman's right to
mous consent of all committee members ahall be required in
order to approve the abortion.
(c) The Committee of the Medical Staff linda that one or more
of the following conditions exist:
(1) There is substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother;
(2) The pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODB § 25952 (West Supp. 1981).
"The term 'mental health' as used in Section 25951 means mental illness to the
extent that the woman is dangerous to herself or to the person or property of others or is
in need of supervision or restraint." CAL. Hiw.TH &: SAnTY CoDa § 25954 (West Supp.
1981).
54.Id.
55. Unfinished Business, supra note 14, at 275.
56. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
57. According to a survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of
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procreative choice. Legislation limiting women's access to legal
abortions have included mandatory information," consent'" and
notification provisions,60 prohibition of advertisement or discussion of abortion services,61 a requirement that all second trimesthe University of Chicago (NORC) in 1980, only 10% of U.S. adults disapproved of abortion under all circumstances:

Circumstance
(1) If the woman's health is
seriously endangered
(2) Pregnancy as a result of
rape
(3) Strong chance of defective baby
(4) Family has low income and cannot
afford child
(5) Woman not married and does not
want to marry the man
(6) Woman married but does not want
another child
For any reason
Average approval for the six specified reasons

% which believed it
should be poBBible
for a woman to obtain
legal abortion
90

83
83
52
48

47
41
67

Granberg & Granberg, Abortion Attitudes, 1965-1980: Trends and Determinants, 5 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 250, 252 (1980).
58. In 1976, the Supreme Court stated that some form of special informed consent
requirement for abortion was legal, even if prior written consent was not required for any
other surgical procedure. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,67 (1976). Federal district and appellate courts have either preliminarily or permanently enjoined
mandatory information requirements which provided a description of the fetal characteristics and giving biased information about the effects of abortion. Some courts have upheld state provisions which require the physician to inform the patient of alternatives to
abortion. See, e.g., Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978), alf'd, 599 F.2d 193
(1979); Margaret v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980); Planned Parenthood
Assoc. v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Akron Center for Reproductive
Health v. Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
59. In 1976 the Supreme Court invalidated a MiBBouri statute which required the
husband's prior written consent. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
The Court ruled that the decision whether or not to bear a child ultimately rests with
the woman and her physician because it is she "who physically bears the child and who
is more directly and immediately a1I'ected by the pregnancy . . . ." Id. at 71.
In 1979 the Supreme Court held that a mature minor has the right to decide to have
an abortion without parental consent. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
60. The Supreme Court has not decided whether states can require parental notification. However, four states now have parental notification statutes in effect. They are
Maryland, Montana, Tennessee and Utah. See REPRODUCTIVE F'REEDoM PRo.JECT ACLU,
WOMEN'S LEGAL GUIDE To REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS I, 11 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WoMEN'S LEGAL GUIDE).
61. Some state laws prohibiting advertisement or discussion of abortion services
have been invalidated. WOMEN'S LEGAL GUIDE, 8upra note 48, at 14 (citing Planned
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ter abortions be performed in hospitals,62 and provisions for individual viability determinations. 63
It is the governmental restriction of funding, however, that
has unquestionably been the predominant factor in limiting women's access to safe abortion.S. The first major case to deal with
the constitutional issue of abortion defunding was Maher v.
Roe.-" In Maher the Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut Medicaid program which limited state funding for first trimester nontherapeutic abortions. 66 Harris v. McRae,67 the most recent
Parenthood Assoc. v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Valley Family Planning v. North Dakota, 489 F. Supp. 238 (1980).
62. As of February, 1981, sixteen states require that second-trimester abortions be
performed only in hospitals. They are California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah and Virginia. WOMEN'S LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 60, at 1213.
63. In Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), the Supreme Court held void for
vagueness certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act which statute
provided in part:
(a) Every person who performs or induces an abortion
shall prior thereto have made a determination based on his
experience, judgment or professional competence that the fetus is not viable, and if the determination is that the fetus is
viable or if there is 8ufficient reason to believe that the fetus
may be viable, shall exercise that degree of professional skill,
care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus
which such person would be required to exercise in order to
preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born
and not aborted and the abortion technique employed shall be
that which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to
be born alive so long as a different technique would not be
necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother.
(d) Any person who fails to make the determination provided for in subsection (a) of this section, or who fails to exercise the degree of professional skill, care and diligence or to
provide the abortion technique as provided for in subsection
(a) of this section ... shall be subject to such civil or criminal
liability as would pertain to him had the fetus been a child
who was intended to be born and not aborted.
PI.. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977) (emphasis added).
64. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 455 (1977) (Marshall J., dissenting) for a discussion of the impact of abortion defunding.
65. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In Maher, plaintiffs attacked the Connecticut Medicaid
program which limited state funding for first trimester, non-therapeutic abortions to
those deemed medically necessary.
66.Id.
67. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The majority upheld the constitutionality of the federal
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abortion defunding case to be brought before the Supreme
Court, addressed the controversial Hyde Amendment." While
purporting to uphold Roe, the Supreme Court effectively limited
Roe's application. According to the Court, Roe did not guarantee
an unqualified right to abortion; the right protects the woman
only from undue burdens on her freedom to decide to terminate
her pregnancy by abortion." Since the state had not directly interfered with that fundamental right, the Court applied minimum scrutiny.'o Because encouragement of childbirth sufficiently justified the withholding of funds by the state, no
infringement was found.71 The Supreme Court has made clear
that it will be unwilling to closely scrutinize state action which
significantly affects a woman's exercise of her right to choose.
Infringement of that right probably entails the state giving another entity absolute veto power over her decision.
Hyde Amendment. For a brief discussion of the Hyde Amendment, see ,upro note 5.
McRae dealt with almost the identical i88uea as Maher. Maher involved a denial of funding for non· therapeutic abortiona; McRae involved a denial of funding for therapeutic
abortions unleu they fell within the provisions of the amendment. Despite the majority's
decision to uphold the conatitutionality of the Hyde Amendment which cut federal funding to states for most abortiona, some states have either voluntarily continued to fund
abortions for indigent women (Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, Washington D.C.) or fund abortiona becauee
of court order (California and Masaachusetts) or have suits pending in the courts (Connecticut and New Jersey). ACLU NBws, REPRODUCTIVB FREIDoy: VICI'ORY SpARK.8 AcTION, April, 1981.
68. See note 5 supra and accompanying text for a discu88ion of the Hyde
Amendment.
.
69. rd. at 314 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 473-74). In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.s.
179 (1973), the Court struck down certain procedural requirements which unduly burdened the woman's ability to obtain an abortion: approval of a hospital committee, concurrence of two other physiciana and performance of the abortion in a hospital. In
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Supreme Court found a spousal
conaent requirement unconstitutional. In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979), the
Court determined that a mature minor need not obtain parental conaent for an abortion.
According to the Maher court, while the above requirements unduly interfere with a
woman's right to decide to obtain an abortion, governmental withholding of Medicaid
funds for abortion but not for childbirth does not unduly interfere with an indigent woman's right to decide. Theoretically, this may be true. A husband who can withhold consent has absolute veto power over his wife's decision to have an abortion; a state which
withholds funds from an indigent woman for abortion but not for childbirth does not
have absolute veto power over her decision. Realistically, it is doubtful that a woman
qualified for Medicaid will be able to obtain money for an abortion. Thus, the state's
power to withhold funds for abortion but not for childbirth acts as an absolute veto on
the indigent woman's decision to obtain an abortion.
70. rd. at 315.
71. rd. at 325.
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The Supreme Court has been willing, however, to inquire
into the legislative motivation to determine whether or not the
state action was premised upon an impermissible purpose.
Under Village of Arlington Heights u. Metropolitan Housing
Deuelopment Corp.,"s a plaintiff need not prove that the legislative action rested solely on an impermissible purpose, or "even
that a particular purpose was the dominant or primary one."'71
"When there is proof that an impermissible purpose has been a
motivating factor ... judicial deference is no longer justified.'''·
One evidentiary source is legislative or administrative history,
"especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decision making body . . . .",11
The Roe reasoning "necessarily entails the proposition that
no governmental action can be predicated on the view that the
previability period abortion is per se morally objectionable.''''
However, government may take action that has the effect of discouraging women from seeking abortion as long as that action is
not predicated on the idea that abortion is immoral."" The majority of the Court in McRae contended that Roe "does not prevent government 'from making a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, ... by the allocation of public funds.' ,,,.
However, the" 'value judgment favoring childbirth' ... is predicated on the view that abortion is per se . . . morally
objectionable. ,,,.
A review of the hearings on the proposed Hyde Amendment
reveals that the perception of abortion as immoral played a very
significant role in its passage. This is candidly illustrated by the
representative who proposed the amendment: "[T]here are those
72. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Village of Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court SUB·
tained the Village's refusal to rezone from a single·family to a multiple· family clasaification. The Court held that "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because
it results in a racially disproportionate impact." Id. at 264-66. The plaintiff was unable
to prove that a racially discriminatory purpose was a motive in the Village's rezoning
decision. Id. at 270.
73. Id. at 266.
74. Id. at 265-66.
76. Id. at 268.
76. Perry, Why the Supreme Court was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment
Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1980).
77. Id. at 1121.
78. Id. at 1122 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-76).
79. Id. at 1123 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-76).
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of us who believe it is to the everlasting shame of this country
that . . . this year over a million human lives will be destroyed
because they are inconvenient to someone."eo Since an impermissible purpose was a motivating factor in the abortion defunding cases, the Supreme Court should have struck them down.
B.

CALIFORNIA FUNDING OF ABORTION:

Committee to Defend

Reproductive Rights v. Myers
1. Facts

Prior to 1978, the Medi-Cal program paid for legal abortions
obtained by Medi-Cal recepients as part of its general medical
funding program. In 1978, however, the California Legislature
inserted provisions into the 1978 Budget Act restricting MediCal funding of abortions.I I
Before the 1978 restrictions could take effect, the plaintiffs' •
filed suit against Beverlee A. Myers, Director of the State De80. 122 CONGo REc. 20,410 (1976) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
81. Budget Act of 1978, 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 359, § 2 (expired June 30, 1979). While
the suit attacking the 1978 Budget Act restrictions was pending before the Supreme
Court on petition for hearing, that act expired. It was replaced by an essentially identical
provision in the 1979 Budget Act. Budget Act of 1979, 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 259, § 2 (expired June 30, 1980). The primary difference between the 1978 and 1979 acts is that the
former provided funding for abortions to avoid severe and long lasting physical health
damage only when that damage arose from ten medical conditions: Toxemia, renal failure; diabetes with vascular degeneration; thrombosis; Addison's disease; high blood pressure with renal complications; high blood pressure with previous cardio-vascular accident; hydatdiform mole; congestive cardiac failure; and placenta previa.
Plaintiffs then filed an original petition in the Supreme Court, C.D.R.R. V. Cory, 29
Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981), seeking a mandate to bar enforcement of the 1979 Act. The Supreme Court granted an alternative writ and stayed enforcement of the restrictions pending resolution on the merits. rd. at 260, 625 P.2d at
783, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
.
The 1979 Budget Act expired June 30, 1980, and was re-enacted by the 1980 Budget
Act, 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 510, § 2 (1980) (expired June 30, 1981), which imposed restrictions on abortion funding identical to those in the 1979 act. Plaintiffs then filed an original petition for mandate-C.D.R.R. V. Unruh, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1981), to restrain enforcement of the 1980 act. The Supreme Court issued an
alternative writ and stayed enforcement of the funding restrictions pending their resolution. rd. at 285, 625 P.2d at 799,172 Cal. Rptr. at 886. Subsequently, the Court consolidated the three actions and reversed. rd.
82. The plaintiffs are comprised of various welfare and health care rights organizations: Women's Litigation Unit; San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation; San Francisco National Center for Youth Law; San Francisco Equal Rights Advocates, Inc.; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., San
Francisco; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles; three physicians; one patient; and one taxpayer.
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partment of Health Services, to enjoin her from enforcing the
restrictions. 8a The California Court of Appeal, in a two-to-one
decision, held that the Budget Act was constitutional.84 The California Supreme Court reversed. 811
2. Issues
In evaluating the constitutionality of the Budget Act, the
California Supreme Court found that, under article 1, section 1
of the California Constitution,88 all women in the state possess a
fundamental right to choose whether or not to bear a child."
The court employed the test long established by the California
courts88 in determining whether the government could indirectly
infringe upon a Medi-Cal recipient's freedom of procreative
choice. Stressing that the state "bears a heavy burden of demonstrating the practical necessity" for the unequal treatment, the
Court followed the three-part test established in Bagley v.
Washington Township Hospital District:88

[1] Do the restrictions imposed on a poor woman's right of
procreative choice relate to the purposes of the medi83. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 259, 625 P.2d at 800, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
84. Id. (citing 93 Cal. App. 3d 492, 156 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1979)).
85. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 285, 625 P.2d 779, 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 886
(1981).
86. CAL. CaNsT. art I, § 1 (1879, amended 1974) provide8: "All people are by nature
free and independent and have certain inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, poaeessing and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy."
87. The California Supreme Court first recognized the existence of the constitutional right of procreative choice in People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
88. In the three decades prior to C.D.R.R. II. Myers, the California courts have considered the legality of a variety of public benefit programs which sought to condition the
receipt of benefits on the waiver of a wide range of constitutional rights. See Parrish v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967) (receipt of
welfare payments conditioned on the recipient's waiver of the right of privacy in his
home); Bagley v. W88hington Township Hospital Diet., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 65
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966) (hospital district discharged an employee because she refused to
discontinue her activities in 8Upport of a recall election); Danekin v. San Diego Unified
School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946) (conditioning the use of public echool
buildings for public meetings so 88 to exclude "subversive elements" from using the
echool for meetings); Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215
(1965) (excluding "subversive persons" from publicly supported low-rent housing
projects).
89. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505, 421 P.2d 409, 412, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404 (1966).
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cal program?IO
(2) Does the utility of imposing such restrictions manifestly outweigh the resulting impairment of the woman's constitutional rights?'1
[3] Do the statutory provisions serve the state interest in
providing medical care to the poor in a manner least
offensive to the woman's right of procreative choice?'·

3. Analysis
In March, 1981, the California Supreme Court held that the
California statutory restriction limiting Medi-Cal funding for
abortions was unconstitutional. IS Although the United States
Supreme Court in Maher' • and in McRae ,a upheld similar restrictions, the California Court reasoned that, because the federal cases presented no state constitutional question, the federal
court had not addressed or resolved the question of whether the
restrictions were consonant with California constitutional guarantees. The court concluded that Budget Act restrictions imposed on California poor women must be determined by the
state courts: "[J]ust as the United States Supreme Court bears
the ultimate judicial responsibility for determining matters of
federal law, the [California Supreme Court] bears the ultimate
judicial responsibility for resolving questions of state laws.""
To determine the constitutionality of the Budget Act restrictions under California law, the court started from the premise, first asserted in Belous9'1 in 1969, that the fundamental
right of a woman to choose whether or not to bear children followed from the right of privacy in matters related to marriage,
family and sex.18 While procreative choice is so fundamental
90. ld. at 505-06, 421 P.2d at 412, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
91. ld. at 506, 421 P.2d at 413, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 405.

92. ld. at 507, 421 P.2d at 413, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 405.

93. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
94. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1976). See supra notes 65-SO and accompanying
text for a discussion of this case.
95. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See supra notes 67-SO and accompanying
text for a discussion of this case.
96. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 261-62, 625 P.2d at 783,172 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
97. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, SO Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying test for a discussion of this case.
98. ld. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
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that it merits the protection of both federal and state constitutional guarantees of privacy, the California provision is explicitly
guaranteed. ee Recently the court has ruled that California's constitutional guarantee of privacy is more protective than its federal counterpart in areas of familial autonomy and sexual
freedom. loo
The court in C.D.R.R. was more sensitive to the implication
of unwanted childbirth than the United States Supreme Court.
It asserted that "[c]losely related to this fundamental interest in
life and health is the basic recognition that, for a woman, the
constitutional right of choice is essential to her ability to retain
personal control over her own body!'lOl Other than in health
terms, nowhere in either Belous or Roe did the courts stress the
profound impact of unwanted childbirth upon a woman. In
C.D.R.R. the coUrt recognized that: " 'The implications of an unwanted child for a woman's education, employment and associational opportunities (often including marriage opportunities) are
of enormous proportion.' "101
99. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1879, amended 1974). See supra note 86 for the text of
this provision.
100. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr.
539 (1980). The California Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance which defined
"family" as an individual or two or more persons related by blood, marriage or legal
adoption or a group of not to exceed five other persons. The Court held that the distinction drawn by the ordinance between related and unrelated persons violates the right of
privacy guaranteed by the California Constitution. Compare City of Santa Barbara v.
Adamson with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (sustaining an ordinance similar to that in Santa Barbara).
101. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
102. Id. at 275, 625 P.2d at 791, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (quoting Karst, supra note 13,
at 641, n.90). Another commentator has stated:
Of all the decisions a person makes about his or her
body, one of the most profound and intimate relate to
whether, when and how one's body is to beCome the vehicle
for another human being's creation. If a man is the involuntary source ot a child-if he is forbidden, for example, to practice contraception-the violaiion of his personality is
profound; the decision that one wanta to engage in sexual intercourse but does not want to parent another human being
may reflect the deepest of personal convictions. But if a woman is forced to bear a child-not simply to provide an ovum
but to carry the child to term-the invasion is incalculably
greater.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 924 (1978), quoted in, C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29
Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792,172 Cal. Rptr. at 879. Thus, quite apart from the physical
experience of pregnancy itself, an experience which of course has no analogue for the
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After the court established that the right of privacy embraces procreative choice, it turned to the question of whether
the statutory restriction on abortions funded by Medi-Cal required the surrender of a constitutional right as a condition to a
benefit. If abortion and childbirth are independent constitutional rights, the government offends no constitutional principle
by funding one and not the other, because the state has unquestioned authority to subsidize the exercise of one fundamental
right without incurring an obligation to fund another. lOS
According to the California Supreme Court in Belousl~ and
the United States Supreme Court in Roe,loa abortion and childbirth are not independent constitutional rights. They are, rather,
two aspects of a single right to procreative choice. The dissent in
C.D.R.R. complained, however, that the legislature is merely
"funding childbirth of some women."loe However, as the majority pointed out, the state is not obligated to provide medical
care to the poor, although once benefits are made available, it
bears a heavy burqen in justifying any statutory provision which
withholds benefits from qualified individuals solely because they
exercise a constitutional right. IO'7 The Attorney General argued,
however, that the state violates no constitutional precept when
it merely declines to extend a public benefit to individuals "who
choose to exercise a constitutional right in a manner the state
does not approve and does not wish to subsidize."loB
According to the Supreme Court in McRae, the Federal
male, there is the attachment the experience creates, partly physiological and partly psychological, between mother and child. Jd. "lIlt is difficult to imagine a clearer case of
bodily intrusion, even if the original conception was in some sense voluntary." C.D.R.R.
v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (quoting L. TRIBE,
supra, at 924).
103. For example, public and private educational rights are distinct constitutional
rights. The guarantee oC a free education is secured by the California Constitution, CAL.
CON ST. art. I, §§ I, 5, while the right to attend a non-public school is an aspect of the
protection of liberty embodied in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, Pierce v. Society Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
104. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106. The breadth of the Medi-Cal program itself belies any suggestion that the state
is giving only the specialized benefit of medical expense for childbirth as Medi-Cal also
funds contraception and sterilization.
107. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
108. Id. at 263, 625 P.2d at 785, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 872.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 6

712

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:691

Constitution requires no special justification for the discriminatory treatment of childbirth and abortion as long as the governmental action places no new obstacles in the path of the woman
seeking to exercise her decision. 1011 However, governing California cases have long held that a discriminatory government benefit program demands special scrutiny whether or not it erects
new obstacles that impede the exercise of a constitutional
right. no
In order to satisfy this special scrutiny, the state is required
to show that it has a compelling interest for implementing the
conditional prerequisites for receipt of the benefits. 111 To test
whether the state interest in withholding funds for abortion (but
not childbirth) was compelling, the California Supreme Court
employed the three-part standard historically used to measure
the constitutionality of statutory schemes which condition receipt of benefits upon the waiver of a constitutional right. 111
According to the test, the state must demonstrate: (1) the
imposed conditions relate to the purpose of the legislation which
confers the benefit or privilege, (2) the utility of imposing the
109. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
110. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781,172 Cal. Rptr. at 869. A
comparison of California and United States Supreme Court decillions demonstrates the
divergence between the state and rederal interpretations.ld. at 266, 625 P.2d at 786, 172
Cal. Rptr. at 873. In Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1967), the California Supreme Court applied the Bosley three-part standard
and found the governmental conditioning or the receipt or welrare benefits upon a recipient's waiver or his constitutional right or privacy in his name to be unconstitutional. By
contrast, the United States Supreme Court in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971),
subjected a similar governmental intrusion upon the rights or welfare recipients to a
lesser degree of scrutiny and then upheld the governmental policy. In Wirta v. AlamedaContra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967), the
California Supreme Court struck down a discriminatory public transit advertising policy
which made advertising space on public buses available ror commercial expression but
denied this benefit to those who wished to advertise their political views. The United
States Supreme Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 41S U.S. 298 (1974), sustained the unequal advertising policy when it declined to use strict scrutiny. The Calirornia Supreme Court in Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 292 P.2d 385, 38 Cal.
Rptr., 625 (1964), used strict standards when it tested the constitutionality of limitations
on the political activities of public employees. By contrast, the United States Supreme
Court in U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Asa'n or Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973), upheld broad restrictions on political activities of rederal employees when it used
a less demanding standard.
111. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 265, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
112. Id. at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
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conditions must manifestly outweigh any resulting impairment
of constitutional rights, and (3) the unavailability of less offensive alternatives.ll3 The statutory restrictions failed to satisfy all
three parts.
First, the restriction imposed on poor women who seek to
exercise their constitutional right of procreative choice bears no
relation to the fundamental purpose of the Medi-Cal program. 1l4
Indeed, the restrictions are contrary to the primary purpose of
the program which is to alleviate the expense of those who cannot afford needed medical care.11& The Budget Act restrictions
on abortion funding would instead cause poor women to be subjected to significant health hazards or even death. u ,
Second, the utility of the funding benefits does not manifestly outweigh the impairment of constitutional rights because
the fiscal advantages are illusory1l7 and the purported state in113. Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist., 65 Cal. 2d at 505-06, 421 P.2d
at 412, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
114. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 271, 625 P.2d at 790, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
The purpose of Medi-Cal "is to afford health care and related remedial or preventive
services to recipients of public assistance and to medically indigent aged and other persons, including related social services which are necessary for those receiving health care
CAL. WEU'. & INST. CODE § 14000 (West 1980).
115. In 1979, 187,312 legal abortions were performed in California. Of those, approximately 52% were paid by Medi-Cal. PLANNED PARENTHOOD AFFILIATES OF CALIFORNIA,
THE FACTS OF LIFE IN CALIFORNIA 1981 (March, 1981) (compiled from State Department
of Health Services Abortion Reports).
116. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 272, 625 P.2d at 690, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
About 1,000,000 abortions were probably performed every year in the United States
prior to Roe v. Wade. Unfinished Business, supra note 14, at 260. See generally E.
BATES & E. ZAWADSKI, CRIMINAL ABORTIONS (1964). The most accurate figure estimating
the number of deaths from septic abortions during the same period is between 500 and
1,000 deaths. This does not include the number of women who die each year from causes
related to real or imagined unwanted pregnancies-like suicide, murder or automobile
"accidents." Unfinished Business, supra note 14 at 260 (citing Tietze & Lewit, Abortion,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Jan., 1969, at 23). The legislative restrictions would have us return
to the days when one percent of the women choosing to risk abortion die.
117. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 277-78, 625 P.2d at 793-94, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
881-82.
Minimal Costs Associated With
Unwanted l!irths
Abortion ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 379
. ..................... ' 2,225
Medi-Cal births. . . .
One year follow-up care.. ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,173
One year AFDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3,972
One year foodstamps ............. .........
240
One year fostercare . . .
...........
5,021
• • • • tt
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terest in protecting nonviable life cannot subordinate a woman's
right of procreative choice.ll8 The Court recognized the "actual
impairment of constitutional rights will be severe indeed."ne
The purpose of the Medi-Cal program belies any contrary suggestion, since the women who are most affected by the restrictions are the ones least able to pay for medically safe abortions.
The budget restrictions do not merely provide a benefit which
the indigent pregnant woman is realistically free to accept or refuse; on the contrary, the state is using the power of its purse to
enforce compulsory childbirth. lI0 The Court concluded that statutory restructions would "severely impair or totally deny" the
exercise of the woman's constitutional right and "only the most
compelling of state interests" could satisfy the second prong of
the Bagley text. 111
The neutrality stance adopted by the court prevents the
state from failing to subsidize a disfavored method of exercising
a constitutional right. Even if the state can show a compelling
inter~st in protecting a nonviable fetus, the state cannot pursue
that interest in the discriminatory manner adopted by the legislature. 111 The state statutory scheme did not protect "all fetuses
by promoting their interests over the rights of all women. "111 In
the past, the court has criticized statutory schemes that restrict
Adoption service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4,263
These figures are based on 1977 coats. PLANNED PARENTHOOD ArrILIATES OF CALIFORNIA,
MlmI·CAL ABoRTION: COST FACTORS (1980) (compiled Crom State Department of Health
Services Abortion Reports).
118. The rights involved are "the woman's right to liCe and to choose whether to
bear children." C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d 792,172 Cal. Rptr. at 879
(quoting People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359). Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1969), established permissible standards for state regulations of
abortions, holding that prior to the third trimester of pregnancy the state may regulate
only to protect the woman's health. Only during the third trimester may the state enact
restrictions to protect the viable fetus. The state's efforts to limit first and second trio
mester abortions to protect the Cetus "inverts the priority of interests established in Roe
and improperly subordinates the woman's right of choice to the lesser state interests
established in Roe and improperly subordinates the woman's right of choice to the lesser
state interests in protecting a nonviable Cetus." C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 280, 625
P.2d at 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (1981).
119. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 275, 625 P.2d at 791, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
120. Id. at 276, 625 P.2d 791, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 281, 625 P.2d at 794, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
123. Id.
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the rights of the poor more severely than others. Ill.
And third, the state has less restrictive alternatives: It can
meet the needs of indigent women without burdening their constitutional right of procreative choice by impartially funding
both childbirth and abortion. 12II The court appropriately acknowledged that the implications of an unwanted child for a woman's education, employment and associational opportunities
are enormous. 126 For a woman of low income, the results can be
devastating. 12? The court concluded that the decision whether or
not to bear a child "is so private that each woman in California,
rich or poor, is guaranteed the constitutional right to make that
decision as an individual, uncoerced by governmental intrusion."128 The morality of abortion should be free to live in each
home; it is not a legal or constitutional matter.l28
III. CONCLUSION
The abortion funding controversy has been but one aspect
of the battle to keep the impact of Roe and Doe within the most
narrow confines. Since 1973, anti-choice forces have been able to
lobby for the passage of numerous restrictions.
124. Id. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929
(1976). In Serrano the California Court struck down a school financing system, based
upon local district taxes, as violating the equal protection clause of the California Constitution. The court found wealth to be a suspect' class in this context because it touched
upon a fundamental right (education) under the California Constitution and thus war·
ranted a strict scrutiny analysis. The Supreme Court has recently reached the opposite
conclusion in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1974), based
upon the Federal Constitution. In Serrano the California Supreme Court recognized the
quality of education one receives will have a direct impact upon the opportunities available in the work force and society at large. The court therefore held education a fundamental right. 18 Cal. 3d at 766, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367. The court reasoned that a system based upon local taxes resulted in varing qualities of education
depending upon the wealth of the community in which the school was situated. Because
wealth is a suspect classification under the California Constitution and, because a fundamental right was involved, the court found the financing plan violated the state equal
protection clause.
125. Id. at 283, 625 P.2d at 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
126. Id, at 275, 625 P.2d at 791,172 Cal. Rptr. at 878, (quoting Karst, supra note 13,
at 641, n.90).
127. In 1977, it cost a low-income family $44,000 to raise a child to age eighteen on a
bare minimum standard of living. PLANNED PARENTHOOD AFFILIATES OF CALIFORNIA,
MEDI-CAL ABORTION: COST FACTORS (1980) (compiled from Population Reference Bureau
Statistics (May, 1977».
128. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 284, 625 P.2d at 797, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
129. Id.
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When the question of public funding of abortion came
before the United States Supreme Court, it held that no fundamental right was infringed because the right of privacy only protected the woman from undue burdens on her right to decide.1SO
Because the government had not unduly burdened her choice by
direct interference, the Constitution required no close judicial
scrutiny. 181
The California Supreme Court, by contrast, has not been as
deferential to the state legislature as the Supreme Court has
been to Congress. In a line of California cases beginning with
Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District, I8lI the California
court has required the state to show a compelling interest when
the government seeks to grant a public benefit conditioned upon
the recipient's waiver of a fundamental right. Although the
waiver may fall short of an absolute prohibition of the right, it
need only impede the actual exercise of the right. 13I Perhaps the
real power of the Danskin line of cases lies in the fact that the
California Supreme Court has made clear that it will take an
active role in examining the constitutionality of governmental
impediments to the implementation of constitutional rights.
In C.D.R.R., the state funding restrictions represented an
attempt by the state to condition the receipt of medical payments for the termination of pregnancy upon the waiver of the
woman's right to choose abortion. Mter the California Supreme
Court closely examined the governmental interests, it found the
state could assert no compelling interests for funding childbirth,
but not abortion. The decision has guaranteed that thousands of
poor women, who each year must face the decision whether or
not to have an abortion, may do so unhampered by governmental interference.
Alison Erca

130. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980).
131. [d. at 315.
132. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536,171 P.2d 885 (1946).
133. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, at 263, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
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